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Abstract
We develop a tractable incomplete-markets model with an earnings process Y subject to permanent 
shocks and borrowing constraints. Financial frictions cause the marginal (certainty equivalent) value of 
wealth W to be greater than unity and decrease with liquidity w = W/Y . Additionally, financial fric-
tions cause consumption to decrease with this endogenously determined marginal value of liquidity. Risk 
aversion and the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution play very different roles on consumption and the 
dispersion of w. Permanent earnings shocks, especially large discrete stochastic jumps, make consump-
tion smoothing quantitatively difficult to achieve. Borrowing constraints and permanent discrete jump 
shocks can generate empirically plausible values for marginal propensities to consume in the range of 
0.2 to 0.6.
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1. Introduction
A fundamental question in economics is how an agent dynamically chooses consumption 
when markets offer limited opportunities for her to smooth consumption and manage earnings 
risk. Since Friedman’s permanent-income hypothesis and Modigliani’s life-cycle hypothesis de-
veloped in the 1950s, economists have developed a large body of research on income-fluctuation, 
self-insurance, and optimal savings problems.1
We contribute to this literature by (1) generalizing standard buffer-stock savings models (e.g., 
Deaton, 1991, and Carroll, 1997) along preferences and earnings specifications, (2) deriving 
a tractable consumption rule via continuous-time dynamic programming, which sharpens the 
underlying economic mechanism and develops new economic intuition, and (3) generating new 
quantitative implications and empirical predictions consistent with data.
Model generalization and new results. For preferences, we choose the non-expected homothetic 
utility developed by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) to separate risk aversion γ from the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) ψ . Why do we want to separate these two preference 
parameters? Conceptually speaking, a priori, there is no theoretical reason to impose ψ = 1/γ , 
as implied in CRRA-utility-based models as these two parameters reflect different economics. 
Additionally, this generalization is well motivated by ample (though not yet conclusive) evidence 
that calls for the separation of these two parameters. For example, Bansal and Yaron (2004) and 
the follow-up long-run-risk finance literature critically rely on high risk aversion and high EIS 
(greater than one) to match asset-pricing moments.2 Additionally, empirical estimates of the EIS 
reflect significant heterogeneity.3
Moreover, we show that separating risk aversion from the EIS generates new economic in-
sights. We find that consumption decreases with risk aversion at all levels of wealth. The higher 
the risk aversion, the stronger precautionary savings demand becomes and the lower the con-
sumption. In contrast, the effect of the EIS on consumption is ambiguous. The higher the EIS, 
the more flexible consumption responds to changes in the interest rate. When wealth W is low, 
the agent with a higher EIS consumes less as she is more willing to reduce her current consump-
tion for higher consumption in the future, ceteris paribus. When W is high, the higher the EIS 
1 Early work includes Leland (1968), Levhari and Srinivasan (1969), Sandmo (1970), Dreze and Modigliani (1972), 
and Schechtman (1976), among others. Hall (1978) formalizes Friedman’s permanent-income hypothesis via martingale 
(random-walk) consumption in a dynamic programming framework. Zeldes (1989), Caballero (1990, 1991), Deaton 
(1991, 1992), and Carroll (1997) study optimal consumption using discrete-time dynamic programming method. For 
additional related work, see Chamberlain and Wilson (2000), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Storesletten et al. (2004), 
Aguiar and Hurst (2005), Guvenen (2006, 2007), Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2007), and Kaplan and Violante
(2010), among others.
2 Tallarini (2000) is an early application of Epstein–Zin utility to asset pricing with production. Also for related appli-
cations of risk-sensitive preferences to asset pricing, see Hansen et al. (1999). In an equilibrium model with Epstein–Zin 
utility, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008) show that the restrictions on the joint distribution of financial wealth re-
turns, human wealth returns, and consumption depends only on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, not on the 
coefficient of risk aversion.
3 For example, see Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Attanasio et al. (2002), and Guvenen (2006).
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on consumption at the two ends of wealth W are opposite. By separating risk aversion from the 
EIS, we identify different effects of these two key parameters.
For earnings shocks, we find that permanent shocks make consumption smoothing quantita-
tively much more difficult. Additionally, discrete large downward earnings shocks matter much 
more than small continuous diffusive shocks. Guvenen et al. (2015) show that most individuals 
experience small earnings shocks, but a small and non-negligible amount experience very large 
shocks. Large earnings losses are often due to unemployment and job displacement.4 By incor-
porating jumps into diffusion models, we capture these empirical features well for the earnings 
process Y and also generate empirically plausible predictions for consumption. With jumps, an-
nual marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) typically range from 0.2 to 0.6, which are in line 
with empirical estimates in Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999). In contrast, MPCs implied by 
standard buffer-stock models typically range from 0.04 to 0.07.
Why do jumps (even when they rarely occur and are of moderate sizes) generate much higher 
MPCs than diffusion models? This is because jump risk is much harder to manage than continu-
ous diffusive shocks and hence consumption has to adjust discretely in response under incomplete 
markets causing the MPC to be large especially when liquidity is low. Additionally, jump risks 
can potentially increase wealth dispersion as jump risks remain significant for the wealthy and 
hence the wealthy’s savings motives remain strong. We can also incorporate transitory shocks 
into our tractable framework. Next, we discuss how tractability helps us generate new economic 
insights.
Tractability and intuition. We measure the agent’s welfare via her certainty equivalent wealth 
P(W, Y), which is the minimal amount of wealth that she requires in order for her to permanently 
give up her status quo (with wealth W , and then labor income process under incomplete markets 
and subject to borrowing constraints) and live with no labor income thereafter.
The model’s homogeneity property implies that the effective state variable is w = W/Y , the 
liquidity ratio between wealth W and income Y . The scaled certainty equivalent wealth p(w) =
P(W, Y)/Y solves a nonlinear ordinary differential equation (ODE).
Our model’s tractability allows us to conveniently demonstrate the following important im-
plications of financial frictions (incomplete markets and/or borrowing constraints): 1) p(w) is 
increasing and bounded from the above by the linear CM benchmark p∗(w); 2) the marginal 
value of liquidity p′(w) decreases with w and approaches unity, the CM benchmark value, as 
w → ∞; 3) the consumption–income ratio c(w) is increasing and bounded from the above by 
the classic Ramsey–Friedman’s linear consumption rule; 4) the MPC c′(w) decreases with w and 
approaches the CM MPC, m∗, the CM benchmark value, as w → ∞.
These results are consistent with our intuition, as financial frictions cause the agent to value 
earnings less and to consume less than under the CM benchmark. Additionally, as liquidity w
increases, self insurance becomes more effective hence both p′(w) and c′(w) should intuitively 
decrease and approach their respective CM benchmarks as w → ∞. Moreover, under CM, risk 
aversion has no role on consumption as a risk-averse agent optimally chooses to bear no risk if not 
being compensated by risk premium. Risk aversion has very important effects on consumption 
under incomplete markets and/or borrowing constraints.
The tight connection between the analytical results and key features of the model makes eco-
nomic intuition transparent: (1) the left-end boundary condition c(0) ≤ 1 maps to the economics 
4 For example, Jacobson et al. (1993) and Low et al. (2010) show that wages may fall dramatically at job displacement.
C. Wang et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 165 (2016) 292–331 295of the borrowing constraint; (2) the right-end boundary describes the CM solution as the limit of 
our self-insurance model’s solution; and (3) the deviations of solutions for p(w) and c(w) from 
their respective CM benchmark levels reflect the impact of financial frictions. Next, we discuss 
our model’s quantitative implications and empirical predictions.
Quantitative implications and empirical predictions. While self insurance against transitory 
shocks is generally effective, we find that self insurance against permanent shocks is much less 
effective and a large savings buffer is generally necessary to manage permanent shocks. For ex-
ample, with standard coefficient of relative risk aversion, e.g., γ = 3, the steady-state savings 
target is around six times her earnings. Additionally, savings are sensitive to risk aversion. For 
example, by increasing γ from three to six, steady-state savings increases by about three folds 
from six times her earnings to almost eighteen times.
Empirically, Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999) document that the MPCs range from 0.2 
to 0.6. We find that it is generally difficult to generate MPCs in this range if we only rely 
on incomplete-markets-induced precautionary savings demand. We show that the MPCs for 
borrowing-constrained agents tends to be much higher at low levels of w. The intuition is as 
follows. An agent whose savings demand is sufficiently large optimally avoids binding borrow-
ing constraints. Therefore, her MPC out of wealth cannot be high as the additional value of 
liquidity for an unconstrained agent cannot be that high as she could have chosen to increase her 
consumption from current income.
Finally, we generate predictions that are consistent with empirical findings, e.g., excess sensi-
tivity (Flavin, 1981) and excess smoothness (Campbell and Deaton, 1989). We show analytically 
how the drift and volatility of the endogenous consumption process naturally arise in a model 
with buffer-stock savings demand giving rise to the “excess sensitivity” and “excess smooth-
ness” documented in the empirical consumption literature.
2. Model
We consider a continuous-time setting where an infinitely-lived agent receives an exogenously 
given perpetual stream of stochastic earnings. The agent saves via a risk-free asset that pays 
interest at a constant rate r > 0. There exist no other traded financial assets. Additionally, the 
agent is not allowed to borrow implying that wealth is non-negative at all times.
Labor-income/earnings process. A commonly used labor-income process involves both per-
manent and transitory shocks that our framework is able to fully capture.5 For expositional 
convenience, in our baseline model, we specify Y as one with permanent diffusion shocks only 
and leave the generalization to allow for large jump shocks to Section 9 and the generalization to 
allow for both permanent and transitory shocks to Section 10.
Consider the following widely used labor-income process specification:
dYt = μYtdt + σYtdBt , Y0 > 0 , (1)
where B is a standard Brownian motion, μ is the expected income growth rate, and σ measures 
income growth volatility. The labor-income process (1) implies that the growth rate of income, 
dYt/Yt , is independently, and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
5 See MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989), and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), for example. Given our focus, we 
also ignore life-cycle variations and various fixed effects such as education and gender.
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We may also write the dynamics for logarithmic income, lnY , as follows by using Ito’s for-
mula:
d lnYt = α dt + σdBt , (2)
where the expected change of the logarithmic income, i.e., the drift in (2), equals




Here, σ 2/2 is the Jensen’s inequality correction term. Equation (2) is an arithmetic Brownian 
motion which implies the following discrete-time specification:
lnYt+1 − lnYt = α + σεt+1 , (4)
where the time-t conditional distribution of εt+1 is the standard normal.
In our baseline model, lnY is a unit-root process and its first difference is independently and 
normally distributed with mean α and volatility σ . That is, our labor-income model (1) is the 
same as the simplest form among commonly used empirical specifications.6
Note that due to the Jensen’s inequality, the growth rate of income in logarithm, α, can differ 
significantly from μ, the growth rate of labor income Y , in levels. For example, at the annual 
frequency, with μ = 1.5% and σ = 10%, we have α = 1%, which is one third lower than the 
growth rate μ = 1.5% due to the Jensen’s term, σ 2/2 = 0.5%. While income growth shocks are 
i.i.d., shocks are permanent in levels of Y .
Non-expected recursive utility. The widely-used standard preference in the consumption/savings 
literature is the expected utility with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). While this utility has 
the homogeneity property, it unfortunately ties the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) 
to the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Conceptually, risk aversion and the EIS 
are fundamentally different and have very different effects on consumption–savings decisions, as 
we will show. By using the non-expected recursive utility developed by Epstein and Zin (1989)
and Weil (1990), who build on the work by Kreps and Porteous (1978), we are able to disentangle 
the effect of risk aversion from that of EIS. Specifically, we use the continuous-time formulation 
of this non-expected utility developed by Duffie and Epstein (1992a), and write the recursive 







where f (C, V ) is known as the normalized aggregator for consumption C and utility V . Duffie 
and Epstein (1992a) show that f (C, V ) for the Epstein–Zin utility is given by
f (C,V ) = ρ
1 − ψ−1
C1−ψ−1 − ((1 − γ )V )θ
((1 − γ )V )θ−1 , (6)
6 Here we assume complete information about the labor income process. It is worth exploring the impact of learn-
ing about labor income on consumption and savings. See Guvenen (2007) for a discrete-time model with learn-
ing and Wang (2004, 2009) for continuous-time models where agents learn about their individual income pro-
cesses.
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θ = 1 − ψ
−1
1 − γ . (7)
Here, ψ is the EIS, γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and ρ is the subjective discount 
rate. The widely used time-additive separable CRRA utility is a special case of the recursive 
utility where the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ equals the inverse of the EIS, γ = ψ−1
implying θ = 1. For the expected utility special case, we thus have f (C, V ) = U(C) −ρV , which 
is additively separable in C and V , with U(C) = ρC1−γ /(1 − γ ). For the general specification 
of the recursive utility, θ = 1 and f (C, V ) is non-separable in C and V .
Wealth dynamics and borrowing constraints. The agent’s wealth W evolves as:
dWt = (rWt + Yt − Ct)dt, t ≥ 0 . (8)
The agent cannot borrow against her future incomes, i.e. wealth is non-negative at all t ,
Wt ≥ 0 , (9)
which implies Ct ≤ Yt when Wt = 0. Therefore, we have two mutually exclusive cases:
Type A: The agent’s savings motive is sufficiently strong such that (9) never binds;
Type B: The agent may run out of savings at stochastic time τ and then will choose Cτ = Yτ
thereafter permanently living from paycheck to paycheck. For this case, whenever 
Wt > 0, the agent is unconstrained in the short term. But the fact that she may be con-
strained in the future influences her current decisions.
In summary, the agent maximizes the non-expected recursive utility given in (5)–(6) sub-
ject to the labor-income process (1), the wealth accumulation process (8), and the borrowing 
constraint (9). Before analyzing the incomplete-markets model, we first present the complete-
markets (CM) solution and introduce the certainty-equivalence-based PIH.
3. CM and PIH
We first develop the CM benchmark and then compare it with Friedman’s PIH.
3.1. CM solution
To make the model dynamically complete, we introduce a traded asset that is perfectly cor-
related with earnings shocks. By applying the standard dynamic replicating portfolio argument 
as in Black and Scholes (1973), we know that CM can be achieved by dynamically and friction-
lessly trading the risk-free asset and the newly introduced financial asset. As all labor income 
risks are assumed to be idiosyncratic in self-insurance models, the newly introduced financial 
asset must demand no risk premium. Appendix A provides details.
Next, following Friedman (1957) and Hall (1978), we define “human” wealth, denoted by H , 
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sifiable earning no risk premium and thus can be discounted at the risk-free rate.7
To ensure that human wealth H is finite, which is necessary for convergence under CM, we 
assume that the expected income growth rate μ is lower than the interest rate r , in that
Condition 1: r > μ . (11)
Then human wealth H is thus proportional to contemporaneous income, Ht = hYt , where
h = 1
r − μ . (12)
Our models (both CM and incomplete-markets settings) have the homogeneity property (in 
wealth W and income Y ).8 We use the lower case to denote the corresponding variable in the 
upper case scaled by contemporaneous earnings Y . For example, wt = Wt/Yt and ct = Ct/Yt
denote the wealth–income ratio and the consumption–income ratio, respectively.
To ensure that the problem is well posed under CM, we require the following:
Condition 2: ρ > (1 − ψ−1) r . (13)
The subjective discount rate ρ needs to be sufficiently large so that the MPC is sufficiently large 
ensuring that the optimization problem is well defined. We next summarize the main results for 
our CM benchmark.
Proposition 1. Under Condition 1 and Condition 2 given by (11) and (13) that ensure conver-
gence, the agent’s value function under CM, denoted by V ∗(W, Y), is given by
V ∗(W,Y ) = (bP
∗(W,Y ))1−γ
1 − γ , (14)
where the coefficient b is given by
b = ρ
[





and the “total” wealth P ∗(W, Y) = W + H = p∗(w)Y with
p∗(w) = w + h = w + 1
r − μ . (16)
The optimal consumption–income ratio ct = Ct/Yt = c(wt ) is given by
c∗(w) = m∗p∗(w) = m∗ (w + h) , (17)
and m∗ is the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) under CM and is given by
m∗ = r + ψ (ρ − r) . (18)
For the case with ψ = 1, we have b = ρe(r−ρ)/ρ and c∗(w) = ρ (w + h).
Next, we discuss key intuition for the CM solution.
7 Obviously, in general under incomplete markets, with borrowing constraints, or other frictions, H defined in (10)
does not provide true economic valuation of labor incomes.
8 Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997) show the homogeneity property for the CRRA utility case and numerically solves 
for the optimal consumption rule in the discrete-time setting.
C. Wang et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 165 (2016) 292–331 2993.2. Intuition
First, the “total” wealth P ∗ = W + H measures the agent’s economic value. Under CM with 
no frictions, total wealth P ∗ is simply additive in wealth W and “human” wealth H .
Second, consumption follows the linear Ramsey rule given by (17). The agent consumes a 
fixed fraction m∗ of her total wealth P ∗ = W + H . Note that m∗ is the CM MPC given by the 
sum of the interest rate r and ψ(ρ − r), the latter being the product of the EIS ψ and the wedge 
(ρ − r). If and only if ρ > r , the agent behaves relatively impatiently by consuming more than 
rP ∗(W, Y), the annuity value of her total wealth. Additionally, the higher the EIS ψ , the more 
elastic/responsive her consumption is to changes in the wedge (ρ − r).
Why is consumption independent of risk aversion under CM? Because labor-income risk is 
purely idiosyncratic and can be fully diversified away at no risk premium. A risk-averse agent 
optimally chooses zero net risk exposure for her total wealth P ∗t at all time t , which is achiev-
able via dynamic hedging. As a result, the consumption problem under CM is converted into a 
deterministic one and P ∗t evolves deterministically as:
dP ∗t = (r − m∗)P ∗t dt = −ψ(ρ − r)P ∗t dt . (19)
If ρ = r , we have P ∗t = W0 + hY0, constant at all time t . In general, P ∗t evolves exponentially at 
the rate of −ψ(ρ − r), consistent with the intuition as that in the Ramsey’s model. Neither total 
wealth P ∗(Wt , Yt ) nor the MPC m∗ depends on risk aversion γ . Indeed, risk aversion cannot be 
identified because there is no net risk exposure under optimality. As the EIS and risk aversion are 
two independent parameters in our model, we can thus clearly show that it is the EIS ψ rather 
than risk aversion γ that matters under CM.
Third, the value function V ∗(W, Y) is increasing and homothetic with degree (1 − γ ) in 
“total” wealth P ∗(W, Y) due to the geometric earnings process and homothetic preferences. The 
only effect that risk aversion γ has for the CM solution is to make the value function V ∗(W, Y)
homogeneous in P ∗(W, Y) with degree (1 − γ ).
Our intuition for the homogeneity of the value function V ∗(W, Y) builds on Samuelson–
Merton’s insight and closed-form solution that the demand for risky assets decreases in 
−WVWW/VW , which equals γ in the original Merton (1971) formulation. By conjecturing that 
V ∗(W, Y) is homogeneous with degree (1 − γ ) in W and Y in our model, we link the curvature 
of the value function to risk aversion, not the EIS.9
Certainty equivalence and PIH. Our CM model has the certainty-equivalence property and by 
further assuming ρ = r , we uncover Friedman–Hall’s certainty-equivalence rule:
Ct = rP ∗(Wt ,Yt ) = r (Wt + Ht) . (20)
However, importantly, consumption is a martingale under the PIH, but is deterministic in our CM 
setting because financial market structures differ. The only financial claim in the PIH framework 
is the risk-free asset. Next, we turn to the incomplete-markets problem.
9 Conjecturing that V ∗(W, Y ) is homogeneous in W and Y with degree (1 − ψ−1) would have generated counter-
intuitive and wrong portfolio predictions in our model with Epstein–Zin utility. This is consistent with the result that 
the demand for risky assets only depends on γ not the EIS ψ even in a generalized Merton’s (1971) problem with 
Epstein–Zin utility.
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We first characterize our model’s analytical solution and then provide economic intuition.
4.1. Solution
The continuous-time methodology allows us to analytically solve the model in closed form 
up to an ordinary differential equation (ODE) with economically intuitive boundary conditions.
We proceed in three steps. First, we consider the agent’s decision problem in the interior 
region. Second, we analyze the boundary behaviors (e.g., W = 0.) Third, we explore the homo-
geneity property to convert the two-dimensional optimization problem into a one-dimensional 
one. Let V (W, Y) denote the value function.
The interior region. Using the standard dynamic programming method, we know that optimal 
consumption solves the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation,10
0 = max
C>0
f (C,V ) + (rW + Y − C)VW(W,Y ) + μYVY (W,Y ) + σ
2Y 2
2
VYY (W,Y ) .
(21)
Equation (21) reflects incomplete markets as labor income has the volatility VYY term but there 
is no traded risky financial asset to hedge earnings shocks.11 The first-order condition (FOC) for 
consumption is given by
fC(C,V ) = VW(W,Y ) , (22)
which equates the marginal benefit of consumption fC(C, V ) with the marginal utility of savings 
VW(W, Y). Note that fC(C, V ) is non-separable in C and V , which is in sharp contrast with the 
standard FOC for expected utility where the marginal utility of consumption does not depend 
on V . Before characterizing the solution for the general case, it is useful to first summarize the 
solution for the case with no labor income, Y = 0.
No labor income: Y = 0. Because Y is assumed to follow a GBM process, both the drift and 
volatility of Y are zero and hence Y = 0 is an absorbing state, in that Yt = 0 for all t ≥ τ if Yτ = 0. 
Therefore, the last two terms in the HJB equation (21) involving VY (W, 0) and VYY (W, 0) are 
zero. In Appendix A, we show that the value function V (·, 0) for the case with no labor income 
has the following closed-form solution:
V (W,0) = (bW)
1−γ
1 − γ , (23)
where b is given by (15). Because b in (23) is the same as the value of b in the CM value function 
V ∗(W, Y) given in (14), we thus have for any given level of wealth W ,
V (W,0) = V ∗(W,0) . (24)
Consumption and utils are the same path by path for the deterministic case (with no labor income) 
and the CM case as all risks are idiosyncratic and are completely diversified away.
10 Duffie and Epstein (1992b) generalize the standard HJB equation for the expected-utility case to allow for non-
expected recursive utility such as the Epstein–Weil–Zin utility used here.
11 Hence, technically speaking, in the HJB equation (21), we do not have a term involving VWW nor the hedging term 
involving VWY .
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Value function V (W, Y) and certainty equivalent wealth P(W, Y). We show that the value func-
tion V (W, Y) is given by
V (W,Y ) = (bP (W,Y ))
1−γ
1 − γ , (25)
where we set b to the value given by (15). By doing so, we may interpret P(Wt, Yt ) as the 
certainty equivalent wealth, which is the time-t total wealth that makes the agent indifferent 
between (i) the status quo (with wealth W and the earnings process Y ) and (ii) the alternative of 
living with no earnings permanently thereafter. Therefore, P(W, Y) solves:
V (W,Y ) = V (P (W,Y ),0) = V ∗(P (W,Y ),0) , (26)
where the second equality follows from (24).
Why do we work with certainty equivalent wealth P(W, Y) rather than directly with the value 
function V (W, Y)? First, certainty equivalent wealth is an intuitive concept and is measured in 
units of consumption goods, while the unit for value function V (W, Y) is utils, which cannot be 
directly measured. Second, P(W, Y) is analytically convenient to work with. For example, by 
using P(W, Y) and its derivative, the marginal (certainty equivalent) value of wealth PW(W, Y), 
we can clearly explain how consumption depends on P(W, Y) and PW(W, Y). Third, PW (W, Y)
is a natural measure for the impact of financial frictions.
Let c(w) = C(W, Y)/Y and p(w) = P(W, Y)/Y . By using the homogeneity property, the 
“effective” state variable is w = W/Y and PW(W, Y) = p′(w). The following proposition sum-
marizes the main results on c(w) and p(w).
Proposition 2. The optimal consumption–income ratio c(w) is given by
c(w) = m∗p(w)(p′(w))−ψ, (27)


















The above ODE for p(w) is solved subject to the following condition:
lim
w→∞p(w) = p
∗(w) = w + h = w + 1
r − μ . (29)
Additionally, the ODE (28) for p(w) satisfies the borrowing constraint at the origin,
0 < c(0) ≤ 1 . (30)
Equation (27) states that c(w) is given by the CM MPC m∗ multiplied by p(w) and also 
importantly (p′(w))−ψ . Unlike in the CM setting, where p′(w) = 1 and consumption is lin-
ear in w, with financial frictions, both p(w) and p′(w) directly influence c(w). The ODE (28)
reflects the nonlinearity of p(w). The condition (29) describes the convergence result that self 
insurance against income shocks becomes as effective as CM risk sharing as w → ∞. Finally, 
302 C. Wang et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 165 (2016) 292–331Fig. 1. Graphical Illustrations: the scaled certainty equivalent wealth p(w), marginal (certainty equivalent) value 
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panels correspond to the CM benchmark results.
whether the constraint binds or not is captured by the boundary condition (30). We will focus on 
the implications of binding borrowing constraints in Subsection 5.3.
Next, we discuss key qualitative economic insights for the main results in Proposition 2. It 
is useful to graphically sketch out the shapes and highlight the key properties of the certainty 
equivalent wealth p(w) and the optimal consumption–income ratio c(w).
4.2. Graphic illustrations of key insights
We plot p(w) and the marginal value of liquidity, p′(w), in Panels A and B of Fig. 1, respec-
tively. To aid our discussions, we also plot the dotted straight lines for the CM results. We see that 
p(w) is increasing and concave, lies below the CM line p∗(w) = w+h, i.e., p(w) ≤ p∗(w). The 
monotonicity of p(w) is immediate. The intuition for p(w) ≤ p∗(w) and the concavity of p(w)
is as follows. Financial frictions make the agent worse off, i.e., p(w) ≤ p∗(w) and cause her to 
value wealth more than its accounting value, i.e., p′(w) ≥ 1. Additionally, the higher the liquid-
ity w, the more effective her self insurance against financial frictions and the less she values her 
wealth at the margin, i.e., a lower p′(w). As w → ∞, self insurance is very effective achieving 
the CM benchmark, hence limw→∞ p(w) = p∗(w) and limw→∞ p′(w) = 1. Wang et al. (2012)
also show that the marginal value of liquidity under incomplete markets is greater than unity in a 
model of entrepreneurship dynamics. Next we discuss intuition for optimal consumption and the 
MPC.
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Parameter choices. This table summarizes the parameter values for our baseline quantitative analysis. Pa-
rameter values are annualized and continuously compounded when applicable.
Parameters Symbol Value
Risk-free rate r 3.5%
Subjective discount rate ρ 4%
Coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 3
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) ψ 1
Expected income growth rate in levels μ 1.5%
Income growth volatility σ 10%
In Panels C and D of Fig. 1, we plot c(w) and the MPC out of wealth, c′(w), respectively. 
Again, we plot the CM results via dotted straight lines to aid our discussions. First, c(w) is in-
creasing and concave in w. Additionally, c(w) lies below the CM line c∗(w), i.e., c(w) ≤ c∗(w). 
The monotonicity of c(w) is immediate. But why is c(w) concave in w? This is due to the 
agent’s optimal response to buffer shocks and mitigate borrowing constraints. The higher the 
value of w, the more effective her self insurance against financial frictions and the less her 
consumption responds to wealth, explaining that c′(w) decreases with w or equivalently con-
sumption is concave in w, as conjectured by Keynes (1936).12 Finally, as w → ∞, self insurance 
achieves perfect risk sharing as under CM, in that limw→∞ c(w) = c∗(w) = m∗(w + h) and 
limw→∞ c′(w) = m∗ = r + ψ(ρ − r).
Our analysis and intuition essentially go throughout regardless of whether the borrowing con-
straint binds at w = 0 or not. Having qualitatively characterized the key features of our model 
solution, we next turn to the model’s quantitative implications in the next section.
5. Buffer-stock savings and stationary distribution
Parameter value choices. Despite being parsimonious, our model generates sensible quantitative 
predictions. The entire model only has six parameters including three (γ , ψ , and ρ) for prefer-
ences, two for labor income (μ and σ ), and the interest rate r . Parameters μ, σ , ρ, and r are 
annualized and continuously compounded. We set the annual expected growth rate and volatility 
of the earnings process to μ = 1.5% and σ = 10%, respectively, in line with values used in the 
consumption literature, e.g., Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997). The implied logarithmic annual 
income growth rate α = 1%. The Jensen’s inequality term σ 2/2 = 0.5% is quantitatively signif-
icant, which is one third of the growth rate μ = 1.5%. The parameter values are summarized in 
Table 1.
We choose the annual interest rate r = 3.5% and set the annual discount rate ρ = 4%, com-
monly used values in the literature.13 The agent is relatively impatient (compared with the 
market), with a wedge of ρ − r = 0.5%, as is typically done in the buffer-stock savings liter-
ature so that the rich have incentives to dis-save when w is sufficiently high.
12 Carroll and Kimball (1996) show that the consumption function is concave under certain conditions for the expected-
utility case.
13 For example, Caballero (1990), Krusell and Smith (1998), and Guvenen (2007) choose an annual interest rate 
around 4%. In order to meet Condition 2 for convergence purposes, we need to choose r satisfying r > μ. A choice 
of 3.5% with μ = 1.5% gives a “human wealth” multiple of h = 1/(r − μ) = 50 when converting labor income to 
“human” wealth. A lower interest rate will give an even higher multiple h.
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the MPC c′(w): Type A where borrowing constraints do not bind, i.e., c(0) < 1. We plot for two levels of risk aversion: 
γ = 3 and γ = 6. Other parameter values are: r = 3.5%, ρ = 4%, σ = 10%, μ = 1.5%, and ψ = 1.
There are significant disagreements about a reasonable value for the EIS. For example, 
Hall (1988) obtains an estimate of EIS near zero by using aggregate consumption data. 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Attanasio et al. (2002), and Guvenen (2006) choose a low EIS for 
non-stock holders but a higher value for stock holders. Bansal and Yaron (2004) choose a high 
estimate of EIS in the range of 1.5 to 2 in order to fit long-run risk asset pricing models with 
aggregate evidence. While an EIS parameter larger than one has become a common practice 
in the macro-finance literature, there is no consensus on what the sensible value of EIS should 
be. The Appendix in Hall (2009) provides a brief survey of estimates in the literature. For the 
baseline analysis, we set ψ = 1, which is in the mid-range of the EIS values and is the es-
timated EIS value for stockholders by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Attanasio et al. (2002), and 
Guvenen (2006). As in Guvenen (2006), we set risk aversion at γ = 3, which is within the range 
of plausible estimates viewed by many economists. Note that our non-expected utility features 
γ = 3 > 1 = 1/ψ .
5.1. p(w), p′(w), consumption c(w), and MPC c′(w)
We consider two levels of risk aversion, γ = 3, 6. Panel A and B of Fig. 2 plot p(w) and 
p′(w), respectively. Quantitatively, frictions significantly lower p(w) from its CM benchmark 
value p∗(w) and the marginal value of liquidity p′(w) is much higher than unity, the value under 
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under CM, and the marginal value of liquidity p′(0) = 1.34 implying a 34% premium over the 
face value of liquidity.
Panels C of Fig. 2 plots c(w). For γ = 3, the agent consumes 85% of her labor income 
at w = 0, in that c(0) = 0.85, which is only 43% of the CM benchmark consumption level 
c∗(0) = 2.00. Even with a very high level of liquidity, e.g., w = 20, c(20) = 1.86, which is still 
only 67% of the CM benchmark level, i.e. c(20)/c∗(20) = 67%.
Panel D of Fig. 2 plots the MPC c′(w), which decreases in w and is greater than the CM MPC 
is m∗ = 4%. In this case, the agent’s savings motive is sufficiently strong so that she voluntarily 
chooses not to be in debt even if she can borrow at the risk-free rate. As a result, the variation in 
MPC is somewhat limited and only ranges from 4% to 6% for w ≥ 0.
Now consider the impact of increasing risk aversion. At the origin w = 0, the marginal value 
of liquidity increases from p′(0) = 1.34 to p′(0) = 1.48 and consumption decreases substantially 
from c(0) = 0.85 to c(0) = 0.61, as we increase γ from 3 to 6. The more risk averse, the lower 
her consumption. With γ = 6, even with plenty liquidity, e.g., w = 20, the agent only consumes 
59% of the CM benchmark level, i.e. c(20)/c∗(20) = 59%.
It is clear that the quantitative effects of risk aversion γ on consumption are very large under 
incomplete markets even for high levels of w. This is because earnings shocks are permanent 
and self insurance is generally not very effective. This is in sharp contrast with the prediction 
that risk aversion plays no role at all on consumption for any level of w in the CM benchmark.
5.2. Buffer-stock savings and stationary distributions
We next turn to the model’s implications on buffer stock savings. By using the Ito’s formula, 
we express the dynamics for scaled liquidity wt as:
dwt = wt [μw(wt ) dt − σ dBt ] , (31)
where the drift process μw(w) is given by
μw(wt) = 1
wt
(n(wt ) − c(wt )) , (32)
and
n(w) = 1 +
(
r − μ + σ 2
)
w . (33)
Next, we write down the discrete-time implication that we later use for simulation. Over a small 
time interval (t, t + 
t), we may write the implied dynamics as:
wt+











t is a standard normal random variable with mean of zero and variance of one.
Let wss denote the value of w at which the drift of w satisfies μw(w) = 0 under optimality. 
The implied consumption–income ratio, denoted by css , is then given by
css = c(wss) = 1 +
(
r − μ + σ 2
)
wss . (35)
In Fig. 3, we graphically determine the steady state (scaled) liquidity and consumption (wss, css)
as the coordinates for the point of intersection between (i) the optimal concave consumption 
rule c(w) given in (27) and (ii) the linear function n(w) given in (33). For γ = 3, (wss, css) =









mined as the coordinates for the point of intersection between the optimal consumption rule c(w) and the linear function 
n(w) = 1 +
(
r − μ + σ 2
)
w. For γ = 3 and γ = 6, we have (wss , css) = (5.96, 1.18) and (wss , css) = (17.6, 1.53), 
respectively. Other parameter values are: r = 3.5%, ρ = 4%, σ = 10%, μ = 1.5%, and ψ = 1.
(5.96, 1.18). That is, at the steady state, the agent targets her wealth to be 5.96 times of her 
current earnings and consumes 1.18 times of her current earnings. Consumption demand that is 
not covered by her current earnings is financed from the interest income rW . Risk aversion has 
very large effects on steady-state savings. As we increase γ from 3 to 6, (wss, css) increases sig-
nificantly from (5.96, 1.18) to (17.6, 1.53) demonstrating strong savings motives for risk-averse 
agents in sharp contrast with the CM or PIH benchmark results where risk aversion has no impact 
on (wss, css) at all.
Stationary distributions of w and c. Next, we report the stationary distributions of w and c. We 
simulate our model by starting from the steady state, i.e., (w0, c0) = (wss, css), and generating 
four thousand sample paths via the dynamics of w given in (31) and the optimal consumption 
rule c(w) given in (27). Each sample path is 5000-year long with a time increment of 
t = 0.05
year implying 5000 × 20 = 100,000 observations per path.
In Table 2, we report the Gini coefficient, steady-state values, mean, standard deviation, and 
various quantiles for the stationary distribution of w, and that of c in Panels A and B, respec-
tively. In the long run and/or the steady state, risk aversion has first-order effects on wealth and 
consumption. While the level and dispersion (e.g., measured by Gini coefficients) for both w and 
c increase with risk aversion, (scaled) wealth responds more than consumption does as risk aver-
sion changes. For example, as we increase γ from 3 to 6, the steady-state wealth–consumption 
ratio wss/css increases from 5.05 to about 11.5. Also the dispersion of (scaled) consumption is 
significantly smaller than that of (scaled) wealth. For example, with γ = 3, the Gini coefficient 
for c is 35.4%, which is 25% lower than 48.1%, the Gini coefficient for w. These results are 
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Stationary distributions of w and c for γ = 3 and γ = 6. This table reports the Gini coefficient, steady-state target wss , 
mean, standard deviation, and various quantiles for the stationary distributions of w and c for γ = 3, 6.
γ Gini wss Mean Std. dev. 1% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99%
A. Scaled liquidity w
3 48.1% 5.96 6.15 3.65 2.19 2.75 3.95 5.25 7.22 12.35 19.40
6 49.9% 17.55 18.39 12.99 5.98 7.59 11.15 15.16 21.47 39.17 65.61
B. Consumption–income ratio c
3 35.4% 1.18 1.17 0.18 0.97 1.00 1.06 1.13 1.23 1.49 1.83
6 40.9% 1.53 1.52 0.59 0.93 0.99 1.17 1.38 1.68 2.49 3.63
consistent with our intuition that the agent builds her buffer stock to smooth consumption over 
time.
We have so far focused on Type A where the constraint Wt ≥ 0 given in (9) does not bind, 
and hence c(0) < 1. For this case, voluntary savings demand is sufficiently strong so that Wt > 0
for all t , and therefore, relaxing the borrowing constraint (e.g., by offering a credit line even at 
the risk-free rate r) has no effect on consumption and thus we can just ignore the borrowing 
constraint when solving for p(w) for Type A. The only friction in this case is the inability to 
perfectly hedge risk under incomplete markets. Next, we turn to Type B, where the constraint 
Wt ≥ 0 given in (9) eventually binds as the agent runs out of wealth.
5.3. Binding borrowing constraints at W = 0 (Type B)
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) document that about 50% of households in their sample do 
not save. We show that this behavior can be consistent with optimality. Consider at time t an 
agent with no wealth, i.e., Wt = 0, and if it is optimal for her to consume all her earnings, in that 
Ct = Yt , then she will remain permanently constrained at Ws = 0 for all time s ≥ t living from 
paycheck to paycheck, or “hand to mouth,” thereafter. The corresponding steady state is at the 
corner, in that (wss, css) = (0, 1) as c(0) = 1.
It is worth emphasizing that the behaviors that we analyze in this subsection apply not only 
to “hand-to-mouth” consumers (with no savings, i.e., W = 0) but to those (with positive wealth, 
i.e., W > 0) who are not presently constrained but may be permanently constrained in the future, 
i.e., c(0) = 1. We define an agent as Type B as long as her consumption satisfies c(0) = 1 when 
w = 0. Not surprisingly, these consumers even when W > 0 behave very differently from those 
who are never constrained (i.e., Type A).
Fig. 4 plots p(w), p′(w), c(w), and the MPC c′(w) for γ = 0.5 and γ = 1.5 while keeping 
all other parameters the same as in the baseline case. For both cases, borrowing constraints bind 
at W = 0, i.e., c(0) = 1.
Binding borrowing constraints generate new empirically testable predictions and economic 
insights. First, they cause the marginal value of liquidity p′(w) to decrease with risk aversion 
for low to medium values of w. As long as w < 7.02, p′(w) for γ = 0.5 is larger than for 
γ = 1.5. For example, at w = 0, p′(0) = 1.53 for γ = 0.5, which is greater than p′(0) = 1.35 for 
γ = 1.5. This is opposite to the prediction that p′(w) increases with γ when the constraint does 
not bind, i.e., Type A. The intuition is as follows. When facing a binding constraint at w = 0, 
the less risk-averse agent has a higher borrowing demand against her future earnings to finance 
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γ = 0.5 and γ = 1.5. Other parameter values are: r = 3.5%, ρ = 4%, σ = 10%, μ = 1.5%, and ψ = 1.
her current consumption, and therefore values liquidity more at the margin implying that p′(w)
decreases with γ near w = 0 for Type B, where c(0) = 1.
We next analytically prove this result by using the closed-form expression for p′(0) and p(0). 
Substituting c(0) = 1 into (27) and substituting w = 0 into the ODE (28) yield14












where ν is a risk-aversion-adjusted and variance-adjusted income growth rate defined as














and p(0) = 1
ρ
p′(0) for ψ = 1 .
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> 0 , and
∂p′(0)
∂ν
> 0 . (39)
Therefore, p(0) and p′(0) decrease with γ and σ 2, and increase with μ. Because p′(w) and 
p(w) are continuous in w, p′(w) and p(w) must also decrease with γ for sufficiently low values 
of w. This binding borrowing-constraint channel, which is absent in Type A, causes p′(w) to 
decrease with γ for low values of w in Type B.
The other striking and non-obvious result is that the MPC for a constrained agent near w = 0 is 
much higher than an unconstrained agent in general. For example, at w = 0.05, the MPC equals 
c′(0.05) = 0.43 when γ = 0.5, and c′(0.05) = 0.23 when γ = 1.5. These results are consistent 
with empirical evidence documented by Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999) who find that annual 
MPCs typically vary from 0.2 to 0.6. Why does a binding borrowing constant at W = 0 generally 
cause the MPC to be high near W = 0? The intuition is as follows. An agent who is constrained 
at W = 0 has a strong consumption demand and wants to borrow against future. Hence when 
receiving a unit of wealth windfall, she optimally consumes a larger fraction of the windfall near 
W = 0 than if she were unconstrained.
What types of agents are more likely to face binding borrowing constraints when W = 0? They 
tend to have lower risk aversion, higher income growth, lower income growth volatility, and a 
higher subjective discount rate. For Type B, both frictions (incomplete markets and borrowing 
constraints) are important. The borrowing constraint tends to play a more important role for 
low/medium values of w while the standard precautionary savings motive are relatively more 
important for higher values of w.
Next, we use our model’s non-expected utility feature to analyze the distinct effect of the EIS 
on consumption and wealth dispersion.
6. Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution (EIS)
The empirical estimates for the EIS vary widely. Given the wide spectrum of the EIS value 
used in the literature, we choose three values: ψ = 0.1, 1, 2 including both a low estimate as in 
Hall (1988) and a high estimate as in Bansal and Yaron (2004) and other asset pricing models. 
We fix risk aversion at γ = 3 as in our baseline calculation.
Effects of the EIS on consumption c(w). Fig. 5 plots c(w) for three levels of the EIS: ψ =
0.1, 1, 2. Interestingly, how the EIS influences c(w) depends on the level of w.
For sufficiently high levels of w, (e.g., w ≥ 19.8), c(w) increases with the EIS ψ . The intu-
ition essentially follows from the CM benchmark Ramsey/Friedman’s consumption rule, as in 
the limit, self insurance approaches perfect CM risk sharing, in that limw→∞ c(w) = c∗(w) =
m∗(w + h) and the MPC m∗ = r + ψ(ρ − r) increases with the EIS for a relatively impatient 
agent, i.e., ρ > r . However, for w < 19.8, c(w) decreases with the EIS ψ . Here, the explicit 
consumption rule c(w) = m∗p(w)p′(w)−ψ helps us understand the mechanism. The component 
p′(w)−ψ plays a more significant role in determining consumption for low values of w as p′(w)
is higher for low values of w. For example, with ψ = 0.1, p′(0)−ψ = 0.97 and c(0) = 0.98 but 
for ψ = 2, p′(0)−ψ = 0.59 and c(0) = 0.76.
Putting the opposite effects of the EIS on c(w), we see that graphically c(w) rotates counter-
clock-wise as we increase the EIS ψ . This is in sharp contrast with the monotonically decreasing 
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r = 3.5%, ρ = 4%, σ = 10%, μ = 1.5%, and γ = 3.
Table 3
Stationary distribution of w: Effects of the EIS ψ and γ . This table reports the Gini coefficient, steady-state target wss , 
mean, standard deviation, and various quantiles for the stationary distribution of w. In Panel A, we set γ = 3 and in Panel 
B, we set γ = 10 including the long-run risk case with ψ = 2 (the last row.)
ψ Gini wss Mean Std. dev. 1% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99%
A. γ = 3
0.1 48.0% 0.92 0.96 0.59 0.30 0.39 0.59 0.80 1.12 1.97 3.12
1 48.1% 5.96 6.15 3.65 2.19 2.75 3.95 5.25 7.22 12.35 19.40
2 46.9% 8.74 8.91 4.64 3.40 4.22 5.96 7.79 10.48 17.15 25.75
B. γ = 10
0.1 55.2% 25.02 27.57 34.05 6.94 9.05 14.07 20.20 30.83 66.66 134.4
1 50.8% 26.46 27.73 20.76 8.58 10.96 16.33 22.46 32.31 60.6 104.2
2 48.2% 27.60 28.31 15.96 9.76 12.35 17.93 24.01 33.31 57.61 90.7
relation between consumption and risk aversion. The opposing effects of the EIS on c(w) have 
important implications on wealth dispersion to which we now turn.
Stationary distribution of w. Table 3 reports the Gini coefficient, steady-state target wss , mean, 
standard deviation, and various quantiles for the stationary distribution of w for ψ = 0.1, 1, 
and 2. Risk aversion is set at γ = 3 in Panel A and γ = 10 in Panel B, respectively.
First consider the case with γ = 3 reported in Panel A. For this commonly used risk aversion, 
the quantitative impact of the EIS ψ on the Gini coefficient is non-monotonic but very limited, but 
the impact of the EIS on long-run savings and steady state wss are very large. The Gini coefficient 
is around 47% to 48% even as we vary the EIS over the entire economically relevant range from 
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partly reflects the non-monotonic effect of the EIS ψ on consumption at low and high ends of w, 
as we just discussed. Despite its limited effect on dispersion, increasing the EIS from ψ = 0.1 to 
ψ = 2 substantially increases the steady-state savings wss by 9.5 times from 0.92 to 8.72.
We find very different effects of the EIS on the steady-state wss and variation/dispersion of 
w for higher levels of risk aversion, e.g., γ = 10. For this case, while the impact of the EIS on 
steady-state savings wss is limited, the impact of the EIS on variation and dispersion of w is much 
greater. Panel B of Table 3 shows that as we increase the EIS from ψ = 0.1 to ψ = 2, wss does not 
change much (ranging from 25.0 to 27.6.) This suggests that steady-state and/or average savings 
for a sufficiently risk-averse agent is effectively independent of the EIS ψ . However, increasing 
the EIS from 0.1 to 2 discourages the savings for the super w-rich reducing the standard deviation 
of w and more generally the dispersion of w. For example, as we increase the EIS from ψ = 0.1
to ψ = 2, the top-1% w-rich quantile decreases from 134.4 to 90.7, the standard deviation of w
decreases from 34.05 to 15.96, and the Gini coefficient decreases from 55.2% to 48.2%. That is, 
the effects for the EIS on the variation and dispersion of w are much larger for sufficiently high 
levels of risk aversion.
The intuition is as follows. With high risk aversion, e.g., γ = 10, the 1% w-rich quantile is 
super rich with w being in the range of 90 to 134 for essentially all sensible values of the EIS. 
With a high EIS, these super w-rich dis-save much more than under the CM case, where it is 
the EIS, not risk aversion, that influence savings, hence reducing standard deviation of w and 
causing the distribution of w to be less dispersed.
The case with long-run risk parameters. Explaining asset pricing facts (e.g., high equilibrium 
risk premium and low risk-free rate) is very challenging. One widely-used approach to match 
asset pricing facts is to incorporate long-run risk (LRR) into a representative-agent model with 
Epstein–Zin utility following Bansal and Yaron (2004). LRR models require both large risk aver-
sion and high EIS, e.g., γ = 10 and ψ = 2, which is infeasible with expected utility models but 
is of course well captured by the Epstein–Zin recursive utility. Given the importance of LRR 
parameter values in the asset pricing literature, we next analyze optimal consumption and wealth 
dispersion with these parameter values.
The last row in Panel B of Table 3 reports the results with LRR parameters, γ = 10 and 
ψ = 2. The steady-state savings target is wss = 27.60, which is 3.2 times of wss = 8.74, the 
steady-state target when γ = 3 and ψ = 2. Not surprisingly, given high risk aversion, incentives 
to accumulate wealth are very strong.
In summary, we have shown that the choices of the EIS ψ and risk aversion γ have first-order 
quantitative effects on wss and the stationary distribution for w. Additionally, how the EIS im-
pacts the steady-state and dispersion of w depends on the level of risk aversion and the sign for 
the comparative static effect of the EIS on the accumulation and dispersion of w differently sig-
nificant with risk aversion, as we see from Table 3 due to the non-monotonic effect of the EIS on 
consumption. As the effects of risk aversion and the EIS are quite different, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, our analysis in this section strongly call for separating the EIS from risk aversion 
in future work.
7. Comparative statics
We discuss the comparative static effects of volatility σ , income growth μ, interest rate r , and 
the subjective discount rate ρ on consumption and wealth dispersion.
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Fig. 7. The marginal (certainty equivalent) value of wealth p′(w) and consumption–income ratio c(w) for μ = 0.01, 
μ = 0.015, and μ = 0.02. Other parameter values are: r = 3.5%, ρ = 4%, σ = 10%, ψ = 1, and γ = 3.
Volatility σ . Panel A of Fig. 6 plots the marginal value of liquidity p′(w) for three levels of 
volatility: σ = 0.05, 0.1, and 0.15. For sufficiently high values of w, the higher the volatility σ , 
the more valuable liquidity is to buffering against shocks implying a higher p′(w). This is the 
standard incomplete-markets-induced precautionary savings channel. However, for low values 
of w, the volatility effect on p′(w) depends on whether the borrowing constraint c(0) ≤ 1 binds 
or not. If the borrowing constraint does not bind, i.e., Type A, the same precautionary savings 
mechanism operates. However, if the borrowing constraint binds, i.e., Type B, p′(w) then de-
creases with σ for low values of w. For example, as we decrease σ from 10% to 5%, p′(0)
increases from 1.34 to 1.47. This is because the marginal value of moving away from the bor-
rowing constraint is higher when income volatility is lower, analogous to the impact of risk 
aversion on p′(w) for the binding case as discussed in Subsection 5.3. Next, we use closed-form 
expressions to confirm our intuition for Type B.
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Stationary distribution of w: effects of interest rate r . This table reports the Gini coefficient, steady-state target wss , 
mean, standard deviation, and various quantiles for the stationary distribution of w for r = 3%, 3.5%, and 4%.
r Gini wss Mean Std. dev. 1% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99%
3% 45.1% 2.29 2.32 1.03 0.97 1.19 1.63 2.08 2.72 4.19 5.92
3.5% 48.1% 5.96 6.15 3.65 2.19 2.75 3.95 5.25 7.22 12.35 19.40
4% 54.5% 13.48 14.78 18.61 3.84 5.01 7.73 11.00 16.59 34.91 69.08






< 0 . (40)
For a borrowing-constrained agent, the lower the income growth volatility σ , the more costly it is 
to be permanently constrained at w = 0, i.e., the higher the value of p(0). Therefore, providing 
liquidity when w = 0 to a borrowing constrained agent with a higher value of p(0) is more 
valuable implying a higher marginal value of liquidity p′(0). This borrowing-constraint channel, 
which is absent in Type A, causes the reverse order of p′(0) with respect to σ 2 for low values 
of w. Panel B plots c(w) for the three levels of σ . Consumption decreases with σ regardless of 
whether the borrowing constraint binds or not. This is intuitive as precautionary savings demand 
is monotonically increasing in volatility σ .
Expected growth rate μ. Panel A of Fig. 7 plots p′(w) for three levels of drift: μ = 0.05, 0.1, 
and 0.15 showing that p′(w) is increasing in μ. The higher income growth μ, the more willing 
the agent is to borrow against her future labor incomes, and hence the higher the value of p′(w). 
Whether the constraint binds or not does not change the comparative static effects of μ on p′(w)
and c′(w). For Type B, we can show the comparative statics for low values of w in closed form. 






> 0 . (41)
Therefore, borrowing constraints have the same effect on p′(w) as the incomplete-markets fric-
tion does. Panel B of Fig. 7 shows that optimal consumption increases with the income growth 
rate μ, which is clearly intuitive.
Interest rate r and subjective discount rate ρ. Table 4 shows that the quantitative effects of 
the interest rate on savings and wealth dispersion are very large. For example, by increasing r
from 3% to 4%, wss increases by almost six folds from 2.29 to 13.48, and the long run mean 
increases by 6.4 times from 2.32 to 14.78. The Gini coefficient for w also increases substan-
tially from 45.1% to 54.5%. While our model is partial equilibrium with an exogenous interest 
rate, our results indicate that in Bewley–Aiyagari equilibrium models, the equilibrium determi-
nation of interest rate will lower the Gini coefficient of w hence reducing wealth dispersion.15
This is why the impact of risk aversion on wealth dispersion is not obvious in equilibrium mod-
els.
15 Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) offers a textbook treatment on equilibrium Bewley–Aiyagari wealth distribution 
models. De Nardi (2015) provides a survey on quantitative models of wealth distribution. Wang (2003, 2007) derive 
equilibrium wealth distributions in closed form under the assumptions of CARA utility with stochastic discounting.
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Stationary distribution of w: Effects of subject discount rate ρ. This table reports the Gini coefficient, steady state target 
wss , mean, standard deviation, and various quantiles for the stationary distribution of w for ρ = 3.5%, 4%, and 4.5%.
ρ Gini wss Mean Std. dev. 1% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99%
3.5% 54.5% 15.08 16.41 19.13 4.26 5.56 8.59 12.25 18.49 39.05 77.12
4% 48.1% 5.96 6.15 3.65 2.19 2.75 3.95 5.25 7.22 12.35 19.40
4.5% 44.8% 2.08 2.12 0.94 0.88 1.08 1.49 1.90 2.48 3.82 5.40
Table 5 demonstrates the large quantitative effects of the subjective discount rate ρ on savings 
and wealth dispersion. A comparison between Table 5 and Table 4 reveals that the quantitative 
effect of the discount rate ρ effectively negatively mirrors that of the interest rate r . For example, 
as ρ decreases from 4.5% to 3.5%, wss increases by 7.5 times from 2.08 to 15.08, and the long-
run mean increases by 7.7 times from 2.12 to 16.41. The Gini coefficient for w also increases 
substantially from 44.8% to 54.5%, comparable to the increase of the Gini coefficient in response 
to a 1% increase of the interest rate from 3% to 4%.
8. Consumption dynamics and empirical puzzles
In this section, we demonstrate that our model’s predictions are consistent with well known 
empirical regularities such as the “excess sensitivity” and “excess smoothness” properties of 
consumption dynamics documented in the empirical literature. These two findings are referred 
to as empirical puzzles as they are inconsistent with the predictions of the PIH.
8.1. Excess sensitivity and smoothness puzzles
Under incomplete markets, given the labor-income process (1), we may write the following 
dynamics implied by the Friedman–Hall’s PIH consumption rule (20):
dCt = σ r
r − μYt dBt . (42)
Consumption dynamics (42) generates the following two key empirical predictions:
1. Consumption is a martingale as the drift in (42) equals zero. However, this prediction is 
rejected in the data as consumption changes are predictable by anticipated changes in labor 
income. Flavin (1981) refers to this empirical regularity as the excess sensitivity.
2. In levels, the volatility of consumption changes is larger than the volatility of income 
changes, σ Yt , in that
r
r − μσ Yt > σ Yt , if and only if μ > 0 . (43)
Note that μ > 0 is the condition for labor income Y to be non-stationary. Here we have repro-
duced the PIH’s prediction that consumption changes are more volatile than income changes 
for a non-stationary labor-income process. However, this prediction is also empirically coun-
terfactual. Campbell and Deaton (1989) document that consumption is “excessively smooth” 
to unanticipated changes in labor income and refer to this inconsistency between the US data 
and the PIH as the excess smoothness.
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and “excess smoothness.”
8.2. Addressing the puzzles
Using Ito’s formula, we write the dynamics for ct = c(wt ) as:
dct = c′(wt )dwt + 1
2




′(wt ) + 1
2
c′′(wt )w2t σ 2
]
dt − c′(wt )wtσ dBt (45)
=
[(
wt(r − μ + σ 2) + 1 − c(wt )
)
c′(wt ) + 1
2
c′′(wt )w2t σ 2
]
dt − c′(wt )wtσ dBt ,
(46)
where the second and third lines use the dynamics (31)–(32) for w. Again by using Ito’s formula, 











= gC(wt )dt + σC(wt )dBt , (47)
where the expected consumption growth rate gC(w) (drift) is given by
gC(w) = μ + c
′(w)
c(w)














Excess sensitivity. Our model offers a natural explanation for the “excess sensitivity” puzzle via 
the expected consumption growth gC(w) given in (48) for consumption dynamics (47). For a 
fixed increment 
, consumption changes over time interval (t, t + 
) are predictable by wt . To 
be in line with the PIH’s assumption so as to compare our model’s predictions with the PIH’s, 
we set ρ = r = 3.5% for numerical analysis in this section.
Panel A of Fig. 8 plots the expected consumption growth gC(w) for γ = 3. First, gC(w)
decreases with w, which implies that the lower the value of w, the more predictable consumption 
growth. What is the intuition? Consumption changes are predictable due to financial frictions. 
The lower the value of w, the larger the precautionary savings demand, and hence the more 
predictable consumption changes are. This intuition is consistent with our model’s prediction 
that gC(w) is decreasing.
Additionally, we may use income Yt to predict consumption growth dCt/Ct . The higher 
the value of Y , the lower the value of w = W/Y , and hence the higher the value of gC(w)
as g′C(w) < 0. Therefore, income Yt should positively predict consumption changes, which is 
consistent with the empirical “excess sensitivity” property of consumption. To sum up, un-
like the martingale consumption property implied by the PIH, our model implies that cur-
rent income positively predicts consumption growth/changes, consistent with excess sensitiv-
ity.
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and consumption growth volatility σC(w). Parameter values are: r = ρ = 3.5%, σ = 10%, μ = 1.5%, and ψ = 1.
Panel B of Fig. 8 plots σC(w), the volatility of consumption growth dC/C, which decreases 
with w and is lower than the PIH-implied consumption growth volatility. The higher the value 
of w, the more effective savings buffer income shocks, and the smoother consumption growth. 
Additionally, precautionary savings motive weakens the impact of income shocks on consump-
tion growth thus lowering σC(w) from the PIH-implied volatility level. Next we use our model 
to address the “excess smoothness” puzzle.
Excess smoothness. Using the Ito’s formula and comparing the diffusion coefficient in (47) with 
that in (1), we conclude that consumption changes are less volatile than income changes in levels, 
if and only if
the diffusion part of dCt = CY (Wt ,Yt )σYtdBt < the diffusion part of dYt = σYtdBt ,
(50)
where CY (Wt , Yt ) is the MPC out of current labor income. Therefore, consumption exhibits 
“excess smoothness” relative to income if and only if the MPC out of labor income satisfies:
CY (Wt ,Yt ) < 1 . (51)
The intuition is as follows. Equation (50) implies that consumption responds less to an unex-
pected change in income, and hence consumption is smoother than labor income in response to 
unexpected income shocks, if and only if CY < 1.
Quantitatively, we show that CY < 1 holds for plausible parameter values. Using the homo-
geneity property, we have
CY (W,Y ) = ∂(c(w)Y )
∂Y
= c(w) − c′(w)w . (52)
Fig. 9 plots CY (W, Y) and shows that the MPC CY is in the range of (0.77, 0.84) for the plotted 
range: 0 < w < 20. Therefore, our model’s prediction is consistent with the “excess smoothness” 
of consumption for plausible parameter values while the PIH generates the opposite empirically 
counter-factual predictions.
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To highlight the stark contrast between our model’s and the PIH’s predictions, we also plot the 
PIH-implied MPC out of current income, which is given by CY = rh = r/(r −μ) = 3.5% ×50 =
1.75, about twice as large as the MPC CY in our model even for a reasonably large level of 
liquidity such as w = 20.
It is worth noting that CARA-utility-based tractable self-insurance models are also able to 
address these two puzzles. For example, by using different conditionally heteroskedastic income 
processes, Caballero (1990) and Wang (2006) show that consumption exhibits excess sensitivity 
and excess smoothness.16 These CARA-utility-based models feature no borrowing constraints 
and consumption can be negative, while our model incorporates borrowing constraints and 
consumption is required to be positive. Also our model generates more plausible quantitative 
implications than they do as we use Epstein–Zin utility, while CARA utility misses wealth ef-
fects. Thus, CARA-utility models predict that CY is independent of wealth and hence wealth is 
not stationary due to CARA utility’s lack of wealth effects, while our model features an intu-
itive property that CY increases w. CARA utility (with CARA coefficient κ) is a special case of 
the expected utility where the EIS equals 1/(κC), which is time-varying and hard to calibrate, 
while Epstein–Zin utility allows us to easily calibrate both the CRRA coefficient and the EIS. For 
these reasons, Epstein–Zin utility (including the standard iso-elastic utility) is much preferred for 
quantitative and qualitative purposes especially when the use of this utility does not come at a 
cost of losing tractability.
16 Caballero (1990) uses ARMA processes in discrete time settings and Wang (2006) uses conditionally heteroskedastic 
income processes that belong to the widely-used “affine” models in finance. See Duffie (2001) for a textbook treatment 
on these affine models.
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We have so far specified the income process with diffusive permanent shocks for parsi-
mony. Guvenen et al. (2015) document that earnings shocks display substantial deviations from 
log-normality and most individuals experience very small earnings shocks while a small but non-
negligible number experience very large shocks. It has also been well documented that wages fall 
dramatically at job displacement, generating so-called “scarring” effects.17 Wages may be low 
after unemployment due to fast depreciation of skills as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). Spe-
cific human capital can be lost and it may be hard to replace upon re-entry as in Low et al. (2010). 
To capture large infrequent income shocks within a very short period in addition to small diffu-
sive shocks, it is necessary to incorporate stochastic jumps into our baseline lognormal diffusion 
model.
9.1. Model and solution
We model large income shocks as jumps with stochastic size occurring at a constant proba-
bility λ per unit of time (i.e. Poisson arrivals). When a jump occurs at time t−, labor income 
changes from Yt− to Yt−Z where Z follows a well-behaved probability density function (pdf) 
qZ(z) with Z > 0. There is no limit to the number of jump shocks and a jump does not change 
the likelihood of another. We write the labor-income process as:
dYt = μYt−dt + σYt−dBt − (1 − Z)Yt−dJt , Y0 > 0 , (53)
where J is a pure jump process. That is, dJt = 1 if the jump happens and dJt = 0 otherwise. For 
each realized jump, the expected percentage loss of income is (1 −E(Z)). Since jumps occur with 
probability λ per unit of time, the expected income growth is thus lowered to μ − λ(1 − E(Z))
from μ. To ensure that human wealth Ht to be finite, we impose:
Condition 3: r > μ − λ(1 −E(Z)) . (54)
Under Condition 3, human wealth H , defined by (10), is proportional to the contemporaneous 
income Yt , Ht = hJ Yt , where the multiple hJ is given by
hJ = 1
r − [μ − λ(1 −E(Z))] . (55)
The CM benchmark consumption rule is then given by Ct = m∗ (Wt + hJ Yt ), where m∗ is the 
CM MPC given in (18). With CM and purely idiosyncratic diffusion and jump risks, consumption 
C is continuous and deterministic, in that
Ct = e−ψ(ρ−r)t C0 = e−ψ(ρ−r)tm∗ (W0 + hJ Y0) . (56)
Similar to the baseline model, the agent chooses consumption C to maximize her value func-
tion V (W, Y) by solving the following HJB equation:
0 = max
C>0




+ λE [V (W,ZY) − V (W,Y )] . (57)
17 See Jacobson et al. (1993) for example.
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marize the main results.
Proposition 3. The optimal consumption–income ratio c(w) is given by (27), the same as in the 


























The above ODE for p(w) is solved subject to the following conditions:
lim
w→∞p(w) = p
∗(w) = w + hJ = w + 1
r − [μ − λ(1 −E(Z))] . (59)
Additionally, we require 0 < c(0) ≤ 1, the same condition as (30).
Jumps have two effects. First, when E(Z) = 1, jumps change the expected value of future 
labor incomes and hence reduce hJ if E(Z) < 1. Second, jumps also generate additional precau-
tionary savings demand since jump risk is not spanned and/or borrowing constrained. The last 
term in (58) captures both mean and higher-order moments effects.18
9.2. An example
The solution presented above applies to any well-behaved distribution for Z. For the numerical 
example, we consider the case where jumps always lead to losses, i.e. Z < 1. We assume that 
Z follows a power distribution over [0, 1] with parameter β > 0. Thus, the density function is 
qZ(z) = βzβ−1 where 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. A large value of β implies a small expected income loss of 
E(1 − Z) = 1/(β + 1) in percentages. For β = 1, Z follows a uniform distribution. For any 
β > 0, − lnZ is exponentially distributed with mean E(− lnZ) = 1/β .
Fig. 10 demonstrates the effects of the jump’s mean arrival rate λ on p(w), p′(w), c(w), 
and the MPC c′(w). We set β = 4 implying an average loss E(1 − Z) is 20% when a jump 
occurs. An annual rate of λ = 0.05 implies a jump every twenty years on average. Therefore, the 
unconditional expected annual loss is then λE(1 − Z) = 0.05 × 20% = 1% per year.
Given these parameter values, jumps lower the certainty equivalent wealth at w = 0 by 30% 
from p(0) = 28.7 under pure diffusion to p(0) = 20.07 and reduce consumption at w = 0 by 
44% from c(0) = 0.85 under pure diffusion to c(0) = 0.48.
Additionally, jumps substantially increase the MPC c′(w) even for the unconstrained case. 
For example, with jumps at the rate of λ = 0.05, the MPC at w = 0.04 increases from c′(0.04) =
0.06 under pure diffusion to c′(0.04) = 0.62. Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999) report empirical 
estimates of MPCs in the range of 0.2 to 0.6. Even though these jumps only happen with 5% 
probability per year and the average loss for each jump event is 20%, jumps are very costly in 












p(0) + p′(0) .
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and ψ = 1.
terms of consumption smoothing as it is very hard to self insure against these jump shocks in the 
absence of complete markets. Unlike diffusion shocks which are continuous locally, jump shocks 
cause discrete random changes in both liquidity w and consumption C due to missing markets 
to manage these jump risks. Therefore, consumption profiles are particularly steep at low values 
of w, implying that with jumps the MPCs can be particularly large near the origin.
In summary, large downward income shocks even when occurring with low probability can 
be very costly in terms of consumption smoothing causing the consumption profile c(w) to be 
very steep especially for low values of w and hence a high MPC in that region.
10. Transitory and permanent shocks
Empirical labor-income specifications often feature both permanent and transitory shocks. 
Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) provide a comprehensive survey. We next generalize the income 
process to have both permanent and transitory components. We show that transitory income 
shocks also have an important effect on consumption, especially for the wealth-poor.
We continue to use Y given in (1) to denote the permanent component of income. Let x
denote the transitory component of income. The total income (in levels), denoted by X, is given 
by the product of Y and x, Xt = xtYt . Empirical researchers often express the income process in 
logs, lnXt = lnYt + lnxt . In our model, the logarithmic permanent component lnY given by (2)
follows an arithmetic Brownian motion.
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of the two states, G and B , which we refer to the good and bad state respectively. The transitory 
income value x equals xG in state G and equals xB in state B , with xB < xG. Over a small time 
period (t, t + 
t), if the current state is G, the transitory state switches from xG to xB with 
probability φG
t , and stays unchanged with the remaining probability 1 −φG
t . Similarly, the 
transition probability from B to G over a small time period 
t is φB
t . Technically, we model 
the transitory income state via a two-state Markov chain.19
We first summarize the CM setting where the modified PIH consumption rule is optimal. To 
construct a CM setting, we need to introduce Arrow securities to span the jump risks.
Human wealth and the PIH. As before, we define human wealth Ht under state st as the present 







Note that transitory income {xu : u ≥ 0} follows a stochastic process. Transitory income shocks 
affect human wealth in an economically relevant and interesting way. We denote by ht the agent’s 
human wealth scaled by the permanent component Y , i.e. ht = Ht/Yt .



















As the formula for hG is symmetric to that for hB , we only discuss hG. First consider the special 
case where state G is absorbing, i.e. the probability of leaving state G is zero, φG = 0. Transitory 
shocks become permanent and hG = xG/(r − μ). More generally, transitory shocks (φG > 0) 
induce mean reversion between G and B , which we see from the second term in (61) for hG. 
The higher the mean arrival rate φG from state G to B , the lower the value of hG. Also, the larger 
the gap (xG − xB), the lower the value of hG.
With CM, consumption is given by the PIH rule, c∗s (w) = m∗(w + hs), which implies that 
scaled consumption is proportional to total wealth x + hs . As expected, the MPC is the same 
as (18) for the baseline case. Note that (unscaled) consumption C is continuous under the CM 
setting when transitory regime switching risks are purely idiosyncratic. We next solve for the 
general incomplete-markets case with both permanent and transitory income shocks.
Incomplete-markets solution. Let V (W, Y ; s) denote the value function with wealth W , the per-
manent component of income Y , and the transitory income state s. In the interior region with 
positive wealth, i.e. Wt > 0, we have the following HJB equation,
0 = max
C>0




VYY (W,Y ; s) + φs
[
V (W,Y ; s′) − V (W,Y ; s)] , (63)
19 Markov chain specifications of the income process are often used in macro consumption–savings literature. Our 
model can be generalized to allow for multiple discrete states for the transitory income component.
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in (63) gives the conditional expected change of V (W, Y ; s) due to transitory income shocks. 
Consumption satisfies the FOC, fC(C, V ) = VW(W, Y ; s). Using the homogeneity property, we 
write the certainty equivalent wealth P(W, Y ; s) = p(w; s)Y . The following proposition sum-
marizes the main results.
Proposition 4. The optimal consumption–income ratio cs(w) is given by
cs(w) = m∗ps(w)(p′s(w))−ψ, s = G, B, (64)

















+ φs (ps′(w) − ps(w)) , s, s′ = G,B . (65)
The above system of ODEs is solved with the following boundary conditions:
lim
w→∞ps(w) = w + hs , s = G, B, (66)
where hs is given by (61) and (62) for state G and B , respectively.
Additionally, consumption at the origin cannot exceed total income which implies
0 < cs(0) ≤ xs , s = G, B. (67)
We now have two inter-linked ODEs that jointly characterize pG(w) and pB(w). Liquidity 
constraints in the two states are now different. In state G, cG(0) can possibly exceed one as the 
transitory income shock xG > 1. In State B , cB(0) < xB < 1. Therefore, the borrowing constraint 
is tighter in state B than in state G.20
Fig. 11 demonstrates the effects of transitory income shocks on marginal value of liquidity 
p′s(w) and consumption cs(w) in both G and B states. We choose xG = 1.2 in state G and 
xB = 0.8 in state B . The mean transition rates from state B to G and from G to B are set at 
φB = φG = 0.5 which implies that the expected durations for both state B and G are 2 year. 
Using the formulas for hB and hG, we obtain hB = 49.80 and hG = 50.20. Because φG = φB , 
the probability mass for the stationary distribution is πG = πB = 1/2.
Intuitively, one can view our exercise in this section as a dynamic “mean-preserving” spread 
of transitory income shocks around the baseline case where x = 1. The precautionary savings 
demand induced by this mean-preserving spread of transitory shocks generates large curvatures 
for consumption rules cs(w) in both state G and B especially for low values of w.
The agent becomes constrained at w = 0 in state B , in that cB(0) = xB = 0.8. Interestingly, 
when the transitory income switches out of state B and transitions to state G, consumption jumps 
from cB(0) = xB = 0.8 to cG(0) = 0.86. Once in state G, the agent saves xG − cG(0) = 1.2 −
20 Similarly, following the continuity of the ODE (65) for ps(w) at w = 0 there is an additional condition at w = 0:
0 =
[
m∗(p′s (0))1−ψ − ψρ





ps(0) + xsp′s (0) + φsps′ (0), s, s′ = G,B .
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γ = 3, ψ = 1, φG = 0.5, φB = 0.5, xG = 1.2, and xB = 0.8.
0.86 = 0.34 per unit of permanent component Y , which is much larger than 0.15 × Y , savings 
in the benchmark case with permanent earnings shocks only. Panel A shows that p′(w) is high 
for low values of w in state B . For example, p′(0) = 1.43. Intuitively speaking, in state B , 
the agent anticipates her future earnings to be higher and wants to smooth her consumption by 
borrowing against her future (higher) earnings, which may cause the borrowing constraint to 
bind. As a result, liquidity not only buffers against uninsurable shocks but also mitigates the 
impact of a binding borrowing constraint, both of which contribute to a higher p′(w) in state B
near w = 0. Panel B confirms the intuition that consumption’s curvature is larger especially near 
w = 0 in state B than in state G. In summary, transitory income shocks are critically important 
in understanding consumption and savings for the poor and can generate large consumption 
responses in state B especially for the w-poor (low w). Finally, we provide a sketch of the proof 
for Proposition 4 in Appendix B.
11. Concluding remarks
In this section, we first summarize the main quantitative results of our model and then discuss 
our plan for future work on wealth distribution by building on the insights and lessons that we 
have learned from the model developed here. For the quantitative implications, the following 
results are potentially useful in guiding our future work on wealth distribution.
Summary on quantitative results. First, we find that increasing risk aversion (while holding the 
EIS fixed) substantially increases the steady state (scaled) savings and generates a more dispersed 
distribution for w. Second, the impact of the EIS on dispersions of scaled wealth and consump-
tion is ambiguous as the EIS has opposing effects on consumption at low and high ends of w. 
For high levels of risk aversion, increasing the EIS tends to discourage the super rich to save 
causing the dispersion of w to decrease. This is not desirable given that the empirical facts on 
wealth dispersion call for the rich to save a lot. For standard values of risk aversion, e.g., around 
three, the impact of the EIS on dispersion of w can be limited. Third, the impact of the subjec-
tive discount rate on wealth dispersion is large, which is line with findings in Krusell and Smith
(1998), and the interest rate effect on wealth dispersion essentially mirrors the negative impact 
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Fourth, uninsurable labor-income continuous diffusion shocks (under incomplete markets) 
alone generate annual MPCs that are typically around 4–7% (even when liquidity w is low), 
which are substantially lower than the empirical range of 0.2 to 0.6 as in Parker (1999) and 
Souleles (1999). This suggests that pure precautionary savings demand does not generate suf-
ficient consumption demand for the wealth-poor. We can generate MPCs in the empirically 
plausible range by either choosing parameters to make the borrowing constraint eventually bind-
ing (when the agent runs out of her wealth, i.e., W = 0,) or incorporating empirically sensible 
jump features into her labor-income process. Guvenen et al. (2015) report that most individu-
als experience small earnings shocks and a small but non-negligible number experience very 
large shocks, which are consistent with our generalized labor-income process with both diffusive 
shocks and discrete jumps that occur with low probability but induce sufficiently large move-
ments conditioning on the arrival of a jump.
Next we discuss our future work. Inevitably, we may be a bit more subjective and perhaps 
speculative than the main body of the paper, where we stay closely to our model.
Some thoughts on future work. While our model’s implications on the dispersion of w cannot 
be directly interpreted as those for the dispersion of wealth, insights that we have gained from 
the self insurance model are useful for constructing models to understand wealth distribution. 
A key challenge for equilibrium models is that the wealthy do not save enough and hence the 
wealth concentration among the rich is too low compared to the data. Based on the 1989 survey 
of consumer finances (SCF), the top 1% wealth-rich own 29% of the total wealth in the U.S., 
but Aiyagari (1994) only generates 3.2% wealth holdings by the top 1% wealthy. How do we 
provide strong incentives for the wealthy to save?
We find that permanent earnings shocks have much more significant effects on savings than 
transitory shocks do because permanent shocks are much harder to self insure against than the 
transitory shocks causing the agent to hold much larger stocks of savings. As a first step, perma-
nent earnings shocks in our model increase savings demand in equilibrium. This is different from 
the standard approach as in Aiyagari (1994) where earnings shocks are transitory hence self in-
surance is effective causing wealth to be less dispersed than income in equilibrium. Additionally, 
jumps capture some key features of the earnings processes as shown in Guvenen et al. (2015) and 
may also be helpful in further increasing savings motives also for the rich as these large discrete 
shocks are much harder to self insure against.
How do we reconcile a non-stationary earnings process at the micro level with a stationary 
cross-sectional distribution of wealth? We need an overlapping-generations model with finitely-
lived agents, as in Huggett (1993) and De Nardi (2004), for example. While we have focused on 
the infinite-horizon setting, we can tractably extend our model to life-cycle settings. Although 
standard finite-horizon OLG models and infinite-horizon models (with stationary income shocks) 
may not be able to incentivize the rich to save a lot hence failing to match the wealth concentra-
tion by the rich, our model may be different as we have permanent earnings shocks with jumps. 
These risks will be large even for the wealthy over their finite lives and hence their savings mo-
tives can remain very strong generating a more concentrated wealth holdings by the wealthy. 
Additionally, in a life-cycle setting, we can incorporate bequest motives and inter-generational 
links (e.g., transmission of ability) as in De Nardi (2004) to further strengthen incentives for 
the rich to save inducing a more persistent intergenerational wealth dynamics and concentrating 
wealth among the rich.
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be lower than the subjective discount rate ρ to clear the market, and hence the rich in equilibrium 
dis-saves as ρ > r . How do we encourage the wealthy to continue saving? This is feasible in OLG 
models with ex ante heterogeneity for preferences and earnings. Here is the intuition. Provided 
that the wealthy have a low wedge ρ − r (e.g., being close to zero) in equilibrium, their savings 
demand will remain sufficiently strong causing them to continue saving at a high rate. Then, 
how do we make the equilibrium wedge ρ − r low for the wealthy? One possibility is to let a 
small fraction of agents with low ρ and/or high risk aversion γ to face high earnings risks (e.g., 
large downward earnings jumps) so that in equilibrium this group has strong savings demand 
but exerts little impact on the equilibrium interest rate, which is primarily determined by other 
agents (large population but less wealthy per capita, however contributing to the majority of 
aggregate savings and hence exerting first-order effects on the determination of the equilibrium 
interest rate.) In summary, by incorporating some forms of ex ante heterogeneity (preferences 
and earnings) across agents, we may be able to generate more concentrated wealth holdings by 
the wealthy who have strong incentives to continue saving.
Finally, incorporating entrepreneurship into our baseline model in an equilibrium setting is 
potentially a fruitful direction of research that allows us to tie models closer to data. Indeed, 
the importance of entrepreneurship for wealth distribution has been emphasized and studied 
in Quadrini (1999), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), and Buera and Shin (2011), among others. 
While our model takes the earnings process as exogenously given, we can generalize our model 
by allowing career choices (e.g., whether being an entrepreneur or an employee.) Intuitively 
speaking, as entrepreneurs are often exposed to greater business risks than employees and also 
face capital-intensive investments, they tend to have higher marginal valuation of wealth for 
both consumption smoothing and investment purposes. We thus expect entrepreneurs to have 
strong savings motives. Therefore, incorporating entrepreneurship can help generate a substan-
tial wealth concentration among the rich, as shown earlier. Our tractable model may allow us to 
provide new insights from an entrepreneur’s perspective.
Appendix A. Complete markets (CM)
First, we complete markets by introducing a traded financial asset that is perfectly correlated 
with labor income. As labor income risks are idiosyncratic and can be fully diversified away at 
no premium, we write the dynamics of the price process for this new asset as:
dSt = St (rdt + σSdBt ) , (A.1)
where σS is the volatility parameter and B is the same Brownian motion driving the labor-income 
process (1). Let ηt denote the fraction of the agent’s wealth allocated to this risky asset. Then, 
wealth W accumulates as follows:
dWt = (rWt + Yt − Ct)dt + σSηtWtdBt . (A.2)
Using the standard principle of optimality, we may write the HJB equation as follows:
0 = max
C, η





+ ησSσWYVWY (W,Y ) + σ
2Y 2
VYY (W,Y ) . (A.3)
2
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the newly introduced risky asset and also the cross-partial term VWY due to dynamic hedging. 
Obviously, W and Y are perfectly (negatively) correlated.
By using the homogeneity property of the value function, which holds for all the cases in our 
paper, we write the value function as
V (W,Y ) = (bP (W,Y ))
1−γ
1 − γ , (A.4)
where b is given in (15) and p(w) = P(W, Y)/Y . Therefore, we have
VW = b1−γ (p(w)Y )−γ p′(w), (A.5)
VY = b1−γ (p(w)Y )−γ (p(w) − wp′(w)), (A.6)
VWW = b1−γ (p(w)Y )−1−γ
(
p(w)p′′(w) − γ (p′(w))2
)
, (A.7)
VWY = b1−γ (p(w)Y )−1−γ
(−wp(w)p′′(w) − γp′(w)(p(w) − wp′(w))) , (A.8)
VYY = b1−γ (p(w)Y )−1−γ
(
w2p(w)p′′(w) − γ (p(w) − wp′(w))2
)
. (A.9)
The FOCs for consumption C and hedging demand η imply
fC(C,V ) = VW(W,Y ) , (A.10)





Substituting the value function (A.4), (A.5), (A.7), and (A.8) into the FOCs (A.10) and (A.11), 
we obtain the following decision rules:






w(γ (p′(w))2 − p(w)p′′(w))
)
, (A.13)
where m∗ is given by
m∗ ≡ b1−ψρψ . (A.14)
Substituting the consumption rule (A.12), the hedging demand (A.13), and the value function 
















By using the perfect risk-sharing and consumption smoothing insights for the CM case, we 








(w + h) + [(r − μ)w + 1] + γ σ
2
2
(w + h) (A.16)
=
(
m∗ − ψρ + μ
)
(w + h) + [(r − μ)w + 1] (A.17)
ψ − 1
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(
m∗ − ψρ





ψ − 1 + μ
)
1
r − μ + 1 . (A.18)
As (A.18) must hold for all w, we obtain m∗ = r + ψ(ρ − r) as given by (18). Then, using 
(A.14), we obtain the explicit formula (15) for the coefficient b.
Substituting p(w) = p∗(w) = w + h into (A.12) gives the CM consumption rule (17). Sub-










Note that the hedging demand η(w) has to be short in the risky asset in order to hedge against 
the idiosyncratic labor-income risk. Using η(w)W = −σhY/σS and Ito’s formula, we obtain the 
following dynamics for wealth W ∗t :
dW ∗t =
[
rW ∗t + Yt − C∗t
]
dt + σSη∗t W ∗t dBt ,
= [−ψ(ρ − r)W ∗t + (1 − m∗h)Yt] dt − σhYtdBt . (A.20)
Note that W ∗t is negatively correlated with labor income Y , so that the total wealth P ∗(Wt , Yt ) is 
deterministic as the risk-averse agent engages in perfect risk sharing. Therefore,
dP ∗(Wt ,Yt ) = d(W ∗t + hYt ) =
[−ψ(ρ − r)W ∗t − ψ(ρ − r)hYt ] dt ,
= −ψ(ρ − r)P ∗(Wt ,Yt ) dt . (A.21)
Special case: Y = 0. Note that Y = 0 is an absorbing state, as both the drift and volatility of Y for 
a GBM process are zero at Y = 0. Therefore, the terms in (A.3) involving VY (W, 0), VYY (W, 0)
and VWY (W, 0) are zero, and we write the HJB equation as:
0 = max
C, η





The FOC for consumption C is fC(C, V ) = VW(W, 0) and there is no hedging demand, η = 0. 
It is then straightforward to show that V (·, 0) has the following closed-form solution:
V (W,0) = (bW)
1−γ
1 − γ , (A.23)
where b is given by (15).
Appendix B. Incomplete markets
Next we provide derivations for main results under incomplete markets.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the homogeneity property P(W, Y) = p(w)Y and substituting 













⎟⎟⎠p(w) + (1 − c(w))p′(w)
+ (r − μ + γ σ 2)wp′(w) + σ
2w2
(
p′′(w) − γ (p
′(w))2 )
. (B.1)2 p(w)
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timal consumption–income ratio given by (27). Substituting (27) into (B.1), using m∗ = b1−ψρψ , 
and simplifying, we obtain (28), the ODE for p(w).
Next, we turn to the boundary conditions. As w → ∞, it is straightforward to verify 








p(0) + p′(0) .
Finally, borrowing constraints imply 0 < c(0) ≤ 1.
Conditions for stationarity of w. How do we ensure that w is stationary in the region [0, ∞)? 
First, the drift in (31) should turn negative for sufficiently high w, so that w eventually reverts 
back to the mean in expectation. As w → ∞, self insurance achieves the CM outcome, ct =
c∗(wt ). Therefore,
lim






r − μ + σ 2
)
w − m∗(w + h)
)
,









μ − σ 2 + ψ(ρ − r)
)
, (B.2)
where we use limw→∞ c(w) = c∗(w) = m∗(w+h) and the CM MPC result m∗ = r +ψ(ρ − r). 
Note that the borrowing constraint implies that the drift is non-negative at w = 0, μw(0) ≥ 0. 
Therefore, there must exist a value of w ≥ 0 such that μw(w) = 0. We use wss to denote this 
value.
As wt → ∞, its process converges to a GBM with drift given by (B.2) and volatility coeffi-
cient −σ . The following condition is sufficient for the mean of w to exist as t → ∞:
Condition 4: μ − σ 2 + ψ(ρ − r) > 0 . (B.3)
The following ensures that the second moment for the stationary distribution of w exists:
Condition 5: α − σ 2 + ψ(ρ − r) > 0 . (B.4)
As α = μ − σ 2/2 < μ, Condition 5 is stronger than Condition 4.
Condition 4 and Condition 5 suggest that in order to generate a stationary distribution of w, 
we want one of or a combination of the following three: (i) a sufficiently high growth rate μ
lowering w = W/Y , (ii) a sufficiently low volatility σ decreasing the probability for low Y and 
hence high w (the denominator effect via Jensen’s correction), and (iii) a sufficiently large MPC 
in excess of the interest rate, ψ(ρ − r) reducing savings (the numerator effect).
It is worth noting that risk aversion γ appears in neither Condition 4 nor Condition 5. Why? 
Because stationarity of w only requires that w mean reverts in the limit as w → ∞ and risk aver-
sion has no effect on consumption when w → ∞ as self insurance achieves the CM consumption 
rule. Note that the standard impatience condition ρ > r in the buffer-stock savings literature is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure that w is stationary.
Solution: Type B. When c(0) = 1, the value function V (0, Y) satisfies the following:
0 = f (Y,V ) + μYVY (0, Y ) + σ
2Y 2
2
VYY (0, Y ) . (B.5)
Substituting V (0, Y) = (bp(0)Y )1−γ into (B.5) and simplifying, we obtain (36) and (37).1−γ
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jumps. We substitute the value function V (W, Y) given by (25) into the HJB equation (57) and 
using (A.5)–(A.9), we obtain the ODE (58) for p(w) and (27) for c(w) as in the baseline case. 
Similarly, as w → ∞, p(w) takes the following form
lim
w→∞p(w) = w + hJ . (B.6)
Substituting the above into ODE (58), and simplifying the expression, we obtain (55).
Proof of Proposition 4. We conjecture that the value function is given by
V (W,Y ; s) = (bP (W,Y ; s))
1−γ
1 − γ , (B.7)
where b is given in (15) and P(W, Y ; s) is the certainty equivalent wealth. Using (B.7) and 
the consumption FOC, we jointly solve ps(w) and the consumption cs(w) via (64) and the 
ODEs (65) for G and B . As w → ∞, ps(w) → w + hs , where hs is the corresponding hu-
man wealth under state s. Substituting ps(w) = w +hs into (65), we obtain (61) and (62) for hG
and hB , respectively. At w = 0, we have footnote 20. Using the borrowing constraint at w = 0, 
i.e. C(0, Y ; s) ≤ X = xsY , we have (67).
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